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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TOP SECRET COVER SHEET

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5. FORWARDED

6/18/59 (Date)

Joseph A. Yager (Top Secret Control Officer)

3. DATE AND NAME OF PERSON PREPARING FORM

6/18/59 Robert LL Guenther

6. PERSONS TO WHOM ROUTED OR READING DOCUMENT	7. OFFICE SYMBOL	8. SIGNATURES	9. DATE RECEIVED	10. DATE READ	11. DATE RELEASED
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TOP SECRET

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

American Embassy,
Taipei, Taiwan,
June 18, 1959.

Dear Walter,

The CAF carried out a single-plane reconnaissance of North China on June 14th which proved to be most successful. It provided the first clear photos of the Shantung Peninsula, the Tangku-Tientsin area, and the Peiping area we have been able to obtain in the past ten years. The flight was of course sanctioned by our top level Washington authorities and carried out under USAF supervision. The flight was "vectored" virtually all the way by the Communists and they sent up interceptors - but to no avail.

The flight revealed that the Communists have first-class air fields at Yentai (Chefoo), near Tientsin, four in the Peiping area (including extensive facilities at the Nanyuan field), Tsanghsien (Hopeh), Weihsien, Kaomi and Chiaohsien (all in Shantung). Preliminary assessment of the photos does not reveal any large missile emplacements in the areas photographed. The reconnaissance revealed two or three abandoned fields and the absence of fields in several areas that had previously been reported.

Perhaps the most important disclosure was the presence of about a dozen new type aircraft on the North China fields. Our experts have tentatively identified these planes as MIG-19s.

In this connection, Defense Minister Yu Ta-wei called in General Doan on June 17th to show him the photos and to claim that the new type planes are MIG-21s. He also asked General Doan to relate this to me so that I could suggest to the State Department that it free the CAF from its present binding restrictions regarding reconnaissance. As it

The Honorable
Walter S. Robertson,
Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern Affairs,
Washington, D. C.

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it now stands, we furnish the planes and control fully the reconnaissance operations of the CAF. Reconnaissance has slowed to a trickle since the Strait crisis and as of now is confined to single-plane operations of the type carried out June 14. These flights have been severely restricted because of weather and other considerations. In September we will be providing RF-101s to the CAF for reconnaissance, but these planes have an effective range of about 400 miles and must necessarily be confined in their operations to the Fukien-Kwangtung area.

Yu Ta-wei's remarks to General Doan suggest that we may be put under increasing pressure to "liberate" the CAF from its present reconnaissance restrictions. After discussions with our military authorities, I think it best that we insist that the Chinese adhere to present procedures. At the same time, I support the view that we should carry out a more active reconnaissance policy in the future to serve our own as well as Chinese requirements. I hope that you and Jeff Parsons as your successor will support this policy.

The Chinese here are also restive about reports of Russian participation in Chicom air activities. They claim to believe that the Russians are manning the large new air base south of Nanchang in Kiangsi province. We have no confirmatory evidence and are inclined to scout it. It is more likely that the base has been built to accommodate Russian or Chicom bombers if they should be needed in some future war.

The Chinese are also exhibiting some skittishness about complying with the Doan-Wang agreement to pull 15,000 troops from Kinmen. As you have probably heard, the Gimo early in June stopped the shipment of a further increment of forces from Kinmen. He has consistently been reluctant to diminish his forces on Kinmen, and probably resorted to this action to have a final test of our reactions. These have been unyielding; General Doan is insisting on full compliance with the agreement. But if the Geneva talks turn sour, we may see the GRC using this as a pretext for holding up further removal of forces.

Sincerely yours,

Everett F. Drumright